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Ethics

The Moral Argument for God's Existence

J. L. Mackie, the twentieth century's most formidable atheist philosopher, agreed that objective moral values would be entities of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe — and therefore concluded they do not exist.

high confidencePhilosophical

The dock at Nuremberg, 1945–46, where a tribunal tried men for acts that had been legal where they were committed.
The dock at Nuremberg, 1945–46, where a tribunal tried men for acts that had been legal where they were committed.Raymond D’Addario · Public domain

THE PREMISE

If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist

"Objective" means independent of anyone's opinion: the wrongness of torturing a child for pleasure would remain a fact even if every human being on earth were persuaded otherwise.

This is the premise a Christian is supposed to have to defend. It is the one that gets defended hardest by people who reject the conclusion.

WHO DEFENDS IT

Four atheists, in their own books

J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977): if objective values existed they would be qualities of a very strange sort, requiring a special faculty to perceive them. He called it the argument from queerness and concluded that values are invented, not discovered.

Michael Ruse, philosopher of biology: morality is a biological adaptation, and ethics understood as an objective code is an illusion produced by our genes.

Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value" (Philosophical Studies 127:109-166, 2006): if our evaluative attitudes were shaped by selection for fitness, there is no reason to expect them to track mind-independent moral truths. Premise 1 is her conclusion.

Nietzsche said it first, in The Gay Science (1882): the madman announces that God is dead and then asks whither we are moving now, away from all suns. He understood that the loss removes the horizon, not just the object.

THE CLAIM

The argument

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. 2. Objective moral values and duties do exist. 3.

Therefore God exists.

"Objective" here means independent of anyone's opinion. It means the wrongness of torturing a child for pleasure would remain a fact even if every human being on earth were persuaded otherwise.

Premise 1 is largely conceded by atheists

This is what makes the argument unusual. Its first premise is defended most forcefully by people who reject the conclusion.

J. L. Mackie opened Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977) by arguing that if objective values existed they would be qualities of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe, requiring a special faculty to perceive them. He called this the argument from queerness, and he drew the anti-realist conclusion: values are invented, not discovered.

Michael Ruse, a philosopher of biology and an atheist, has written that morality is a biological adaptation and that ethics, understood as an objective code, is an illusion produced by our genes to make us cooperate.

Sharon Street's "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value" (Philosophical Studies 127:109-166, 2006) makes the case with the most rigor: if our evaluative attitudes were shaped by selection for reproductive fitness, there is no reason to expect them to track mind-independent moral truths. Street is an atheist arguing against moral realism. Premise 1 is her conclusion.

And Nietzsche said it first and plainest. In The Gay Science (1882) he has the madman announce that God is dead and then demand: whither is it moving now? away from all suns? He understood that the loss of God removes the horizon, not just the object.

Premise 2 is known more surely than any argument against it

We do not infer that the Holocaust was evil; we perceive it, the way we perceive that the external world exists. Any premise in an argument concluding that it was merely socially disfavoured is less certain than the thing it denies.

The international community acted on premise 2 in 1945. At Nuremberg the defence argued that the accused had acted in accordance with the law of their state. The tribunal convicted anyway, on the ground of crimes against humanity — a standard above the positive law of any nation.

That verdict is unintelligible unless there is a law above the law.

What scripture already says

Romans 2:14-15 describes Gentiles without the Law doing by nature the things of the Law, showing the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness. The moral argument is not an addition to that; it is the philosophical restatement of it.

WHERE IT STANDS

The state of the debate

high confidence

The live opposition is not anti-realism but non-theistic moral realism: Erik Wielenberg (Robust Ethical Realism, 2009; God and the Reach of Reason, 2008), David Enoch and the later Derek Parfit hold that moral facts are brute necessary truths standing in need of no grounding at all, as mathematical truths do. Whether brute moral facts are more or less plausible than a moral Lawgiver is the actual fault line, and it is a live dispute in professional metaethics.

Scripture on this

Romans 2:14-15 — The work of the law written in the heart, conscience bearing witness.

Romans 1:32 — Knowing the judgment of God — moral knowledge presumed even where it is defied.

Genesis 1:27 — The image of God as the ground of human worth and moral standing.

Micah 6:8 — What the LORD requires — justice as revealed obligation, not preference.

Psalm 19:7-9 — The law of the LORD is perfect; His judgments are true and righteous altogether.

James 4:12 — There is one lawgiver — the argument's conclusion stated as doctrine.

6 pieces of evidence

What this establishes

  1. 01The record

    The argument's first premise is defended by leading atheists — Mackie's argument from queerness (Ethics, 1977) and Street's Darwinian dilemma (Philosophical Studies 127, 2006) both conclude that a godless universe has no objective values.

  2. 02The record

    Premise 2 is known more securely than any premise in an argument against it; moral perception functions like sense perception.

  3. 03The record

    Nuremberg convicted on crimes against humanity over the defence of obedience to state law — an institutional act that presupposes a standard above human legislation.

  4. 04The record

    The Euthyphro dilemma is a false one: goodness is neither above God nor invented by Him but identical with His nature (Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 1999).

  5. 05The record

    Evolution can explain why we hold moral beliefs; it cannot explain why any of them would be true, which is a different question.

  6. 06The record

    Romans 2:14-15 already asserts a moral law written on the conscience of people who never received the Torah.

1 objection taken at full strength

The objections, answered

  1. THE OBJECTION01Plato's Euthyphro (10a) asks whether the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, or pious because they love it. Applied here: is a thing good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? Either God's commands are arbitrary or goodness stands above Him.

    THE ANSWER

    The classical Christian answer refuses both horns. Goodness is neither above God nor invented by Him; it is identical with His nature. Commands flow from that nature and therefore cannot be arbitrary, and there is no standard above God because the standard is God.

    Robert Adams develops this rigorously in Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford, 1999).

6 passages

Key verses

Berean Standard Bible

THE RECEIPTS

Sources

Contested pointscontested
  • Moral realism without God is a serious position, not a dodge. Wielenberg, Enoch and Parfit argue that basic moral truths are necessary and self-standing, requiring no more grounding than the truths of arithmetic — and nobody demands a Lawgiver to explain why 2+2=4.
  • The Euthyphro answer relocates rather than dissolves the problem. Saying God's nature is the standard invites the question of why that nature counts as good, and answering 'because it is God's' makes goodness a matter of identity rather than of value.
  • Premise 2 is precisely what is in dispute. Mackie, Ruse and Street accept premise 1 and reject premise 2 without inconsistency; the argument only bites against someone who already holds moral realism.
  • Convergent moral intuitions have a naturalistic explanation. Kin selection, reciprocal altruism and cultural group selection predict near-universal prohibitions on in-group killing and betrayal without any transcendent lawgiver.