mannafest.faith

Theodicy

The Problem of Evil: Christian Responses

J. L. Mackie framed the logical problem of evil in Mind in 1955; in 1982 he conceded that Alvin Plantinga's free will defence had answered it, and the philosophical debate moved to the weaker evidential form.

high confidencePhilosophical

The ruined cathedral of Lisbon after the earthquake of 1 November 1755, engraved by Jacques-Philippe Le Bas — the disaster that made the problem of evil a modern question.
The ruined cathedral of Lisbon after the earthquake of 1 November 1755, engraved by Jacques-Philippe Le Bas — the disaster that made the problem of evil a modern question.Jacques-Philippe Le Bas · Public domain

THE CHARGE

Mackie, 1955

An all-powerful, all-good God and any evil at all cannot both exist. The claim is not that evil counts against God — it is that theism contradicts itself, the way a square circle does.

If that were true, no evidence would be needed on either side. The case would be closed by inspection.

THE CONCESSION

Mackie, 1982

In The Miracle of Theism, the same philosopher granted that Plantinga's free will defence is formally possible, and that the problem of evil does not show the central doctrines of theism to be logically inconsistent with one another.

William Rowe — who carried the argument forward in its evidential form — wrote that some philosophers have concluded the logical argument is bankrupt.

Concessions of that clarity are rare in philosophy, and they are why the professional debate has moved to the evidential version.

The span, dated

  1. 1955

    Mackie files the charge

    "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind 64:200-212: theism is internally contradictory — an all-powerful, all-good God and any evil at all cannot both exist.

  2. 1966

    Hick: a vale of soul-making

    Evil and the God of Love (Macmillan) revives the Irenaean idea that this world is not a hedonic optimum: courage, compassion and endurance are not possible in a world without cost.

  3. 1974

    Plantinga's free will defence

    God, Freedom, and Evil, and formally in The Nature of Necessity ch. 9. It does not say why God permits evil — it only shows a possible state of affairs in which God and evil coexist, because one consistent story defeats a charge of contradiction.

  4. 1979

    Rowe reframes it as evidence

    "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16:335-341 — not that evil disproves God, but that the amount and distribution of apparently pointless suffering makes God improbable. The harder argument.

  5. 1982

    Mackie concedes the logical form

    In The Miracle of Theism (Oxford) Mackie grants that the free will defence is formally possible and that the problem of evil does not, after all, show the central doctrines of theism to be logically inconsistent with one another.

  6. 1984

    Wykstra's CORNEA

    "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16:73-93. The inference from "I see no reason" to "there is no reason" is valid only if you would expect to see the reason if it existed. A one-month-old cannot assess a parent's reasons.

Two different arguments run under one name. The logical problem is settled; the evidential problem is live, and is answered rather than dismissed.

THE CLAIM

Two different arguments

The logical problem claims theism is internally contradictory: an all-powerful, all-good God and any evil at all cannot both exist. J. L. Mackie put it in "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind 64:200-212 (1955).

The evidential problem claims something weaker and harder: not that evil disproves God, but that the amount and distribution of apparently pointless suffering makes God improbable. William Rowe's "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16:335-341 (1979), is the standard statement.

The logical problem is settled

Alvin Plantinga's free will defence (God, Freedom, and Evil, Eerdmans, 1974; formally in The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, 1974, ch. 9) does not attempt to say why God permits evil. It only needs to show a possible state of affairs in which God and evil coexist — because the charge is contradiction, and one consistent story defeats a charge of contradiction.

The story: creatures with libertarian freedom may be such that in any world where God creates them free, they go wrong at least once. Plantinga calls this transworld depravity. If it is even possible, then it is possible that God could not create a world of free creatures containing no moral evil.

In The Miracle of Theism (Oxford, 1982) Mackie granted that the defence is formally possible and that the problem of evil does not, after all, show the central doctrines of theism to be logically inconsistent with one another. Rowe himself wrote that some philosophers have concluded the logical argument is bankrupt. Concessions of that clarity are rare in philosophy.

THE ANSWER

The evidential problem and the serious reply

Rowe's example is a fawn burned in a lightning-started forest fire, dying alone over several days, its suffering witnessed by no one. It looks pointless. From that he argues: probably it is.

Stephen Wykstra's reply — "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16:73-93 (1984) — introduced the condition of reasonable epistemic access, or CORNEA. The inference from "I see no reason" to "there is no reason" is only valid if you would expect to see the reason if it existed. A one-month-old cannot assess a parent's reasons; the gap in cognitive power is decisive.

Isaiah 55:8-9 states exactly this asymmetry, in terms of the distance between heaven and earth. This position is called skeptical theism, and it is the majority theist reply in the professional literature.

The theodicies

Soul-making. John Hick's Evil and the God of Love (Macmillan, 1966) revived the Irenaean idea that this world is a vale of soul-making, not a hedonic optimum: courage, compassion and endurance are not possible in a world without cost. Romans 5:3-5 and James 1:2-4 make the same move.

Free will. Love that cannot be refused is not love. A world of creatures who cannot rebel is a world without moral agents.

What christianity offers that no theodicy does

Job asks for reasons through thirty-seven chapters and never receives them. What he receives is God — and he says it is enough (Job 42:5).

Habakkuk opens with an unanswered complaint about violence and injustice and ends by choosing to rejoice while the fig tree does not blossom (Habakkuk 3:17-19). The complaint is not resolved; the prophet is.

And the distinctive Christian claim is that God did not answer suffering from outside it. Isaiah 53:3 calls the Messiah a man of sorrows, acquainted with grief. Whatever else the cross is, it is God's refusal to remain a spectator.

That is not a proof. It is the reason the argument has never emptied the churches.

WHERE IT STANDS

The state of scholarship

high confidence

The logical problem is largely retired. The live disputes are the cost of skeptical theism — Michael Bergmann against Paul Draper on whether it corrodes ordinary moral reasoning — and the force of horrendous evils, argued most searchingly by Marilyn McCord Adams in Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Cornell, 1999), who is herself a Christian philosopher and does not think the standard theodicies suffice.

Scripture on this

Job 42:5 — I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee — presence instead of explanation.

Habakkuk 1:2-4 — The complaint stated at full strength, inside Scripture itself.

Habakkuk 3:17-19 — Yet will I rejoice — resolution without an answer.

Isaiah 55:8-9 — The cognitive gap that skeptical theism formalizes.

Isaiah 53:3 — A man of sorrows, acquainted with grief — God inside the suffering.

Romans 5:3-5 — Tribulation works patience; the soul-making claim in Paul's words.

James 1:2-4 — The trying of your faith works patience.

Revelation 21:4 — The promise that the condition is temporary, not permanent.

6 pieces of evidence

What this establishes

  1. 01The record

    The logical problem of evil is answered: Plantinga's free will defence needs only a possible scenario, and Mackie conceded in The Miracle of Theism (1982) that it establishes no inconsistency.

  2. 02The record

    Skeptical theism blocks the evidential inference — Wykstra's CORNEA (IJPR 16, 1984) shows that 'I see no reason' supports 'there is no reason' only where you would expect to see it.

  3. 03The record

    Free will has a cost that cannot be subtracted: love that cannot be refused is not love, and agents who cannot rebel are not agents.

  4. 04The record

    Hick's soul-making theodicy identifies goods — courage, compassion, endurance — that are logically impossible in a world without cost.

  5. 05The record

    The problem cuts both ways: calling suffering objectively evil presupposes an objective standard the atheist must independently account for.

  6. 06The text

    Scripture never offers Job or Habakkuk an explanation; it offers God's presence, and the cross is the claim that He entered the suffering rather than explaining it.

8 passages

Key verses

Berean Standard Bible

THE RECEIPTS

Sources

Contested pointscontested
  • Free will explains moral evil and leaves natural evil untouched. No human choice caused the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, childhood leukaemia, or the parasitic wasps that troubled Darwin.
  • Rowe's argument is quantitative and the replies rarely engage the quantity. The claim is not that some suffering is unexplained but that its scale and distribution — including the suffering of animals and infants who can learn nothing from it — is what one would expect if no one were in charge.
  • Skeptical theism proves too much. If our grasp of goods and evils is too weak to judge that a burning fawn is pointless, it is also too weak to trust that apparent goods are good, that God is trustworthy, or that any moral appearance is reliable. The defence purchases God's innocence at the price of moral knowledge.
  • Hiddenness compounds the problem. J. L. Schellenberg (Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, 1993) argues that a perfectly loving God would ensure that no one capable of relationship with Him remained in non-culpable doubt — and many do.